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After confirming the ‘extreme seriousness of enforced disappearance’, the 
fourth recital of the preamble of the International Convention for the Protection 
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance states that enforced disappearance 
‘constitutes a crime and, in certain circumstances defined in international law, a 
crime against humanity’. The point is further developed in article 5 of the 
Convention: ‘The widespread or systematic practice of enforced disappearance 
constitutes a crime against humanity as defined in applicable international law 
and shall attract the consequences provided for under such applicable 
international law.’1 The drafters of the Convention obviously recognised that not 
all enforced disappearances would also constitute crimes against humanity. They 
were well aware of the definition of the crime against humanity of enforced 
disappearance set out in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court but 
also quite deliberate in efforts to enlarge this so as to cover enforced 
disappearances that were not crimes against humanity.2 
I. ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE AT NUREMBERG 
Although the modern expression ‘enforced disappearance’ was not used at the 
time, the substance of this crime was prosecuted by the earliest international 
criminal courts. Both the International Military Tribunal and the American 
Military Tribunals that sat at Nuremberg dealt with the Nacht und Nebel Erlass, 
the ‘night and fog decree’, issued on 7 December 1941, using the legal 
characterization of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The expression 
comes from the Tarnhelm spell, pronounced by Alberich to his brother Mime in 
Das Rheingold, the first of Richard Wagner’s four Ring Cycle works: ‘Nacht und 
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1 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, (2010) 
2716 UNTS 3. 
2 Report of the intersessional open-ended working group to elaborate a draft legally binding 
normative instrument for the protection of all persons from enforced disappearance, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/2004/59, paras. 17-18, 42-48. 
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Nebel, niemand gleich! Siehst du mich, Bruder?’ During the International 
Military Tribunal trial, Marie Claude Vaillant-Couturier described being taken to 
the NN or Nacht und Nebel block at Ravensbrück.3 Another witness called by the 
French prosecutor, Hans Cappelen, said he had been considered a ‘Nacht und 
Nebel prisoner’ when at the Natzweiler camp, in Alsace.4 As Nuit et brouillard, 
the term was used as the title of Alain Resnais’ short documentary about the 
Nazi concentration camps. 
Filed as an American exhibit, an excerpt from the Nacht und Nebel decree was 
read into the record of the International Military Tribunal by the French deputy 
prosecutor, Charles Dubost: ‘Penalty for such offenses, consisting of loss of 
freedom and even a life sentence is a sign of weakness. Only death sentence or 
measures which entail ignorance of the fate of the guilty by local population will 
achieve real effectiveness.’5 In one of the subsequent proceedings, a version of 
the decree destined to be shown to prisoners was filed as an exhibit: 
“As it is the purpose of this decree to leave the relatives, friends, and 
acquaintances in uncertainty regarding the fate of the prisoners; they are not 
allowed to have any means of communication with the outside world. They may 
therefore neither write, nor receive letters, parcels, or visits. Nor will any kind of 
information regarding the prisoners be given to any agency outside. In cases of 
death, the relatives are not to be informed until further notice. There has not yet 
been a final ruling on this question.”6 
The chief of the legal division of the German armed forces, Rudolf Lehmann, 
testified about the origin of the decree: 
“There arose in France, after the beginning of the Russian campaign, the 
resistance movement which became very active. Hitler complained to the justice 
administration of the armed forces that on account of their attitude they were not in 
a position to suppress that resistance movement. That is the general background 
for the Nacht und Nebel Decree. 
In detail this is what happened-In the beginning of October 1941 I received a letter 
from Field Marshal Keitel-but I want to state here that Keitel was always at 
headquarters, whereas I was always in Berlin. In this letter, which all my assistants 
have read, Keitel passed on a directive which he had received from Hitler. The 
letter was quite long, several pages in handwriting. In that letter, it was expressed 
that Hitler considered the resistance movement in France a tremendous danger for 
the German troops. It could be seen that the methods previously used were not 
sufficient to suppress that movement. There was no sense in passing sentences of 
prison terms-considering conditions as they were-which were handed down after a 
long period. That was not the right deterrent which the armed forces should 
employ; therefore, new means would have to be found… 
                                                                          
3 France et al. v. Goering et al., Transcript, 28 January 1946, (1947) 6 IMT 203, at p. 220. 
4 France et al. v. Goering et al., Transcript, 29 January 1946, (1947) 6 IMT 268, at p. 283. 
5 France et al. v. Goering et al., Transcript, 25 January 1946, (1947) 6 IMT 177, at p. 182 
6 United States of America v. Alstötter et al., Prosecution Exhibit 310, (1951) 3 TWC 786, at p. 787. 
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The Fuehrer demanded that Frenchmen who were suspected of such acts, during 
night and fog - that is where the expression comes from - should be brought across 
the border and that in Germany they should be held completely incommunicado. 
That should only not apply in those cases where immediately a death sentence 
could be passed in France. This measure could be used as a deterrent…”7 
It was discussed by the International Military Tribunal in its judgment of 30 
September-1 October 1946: 
“The territories occupied by Germany were administered in violation of the laws of 
war. The evidence is quite overwhelming of a systematic rule of violence, brutality, 
and terror. On 7 December 1941 Hitler issued the directive since known as the 
‘Nacht und Nebel Erlass’ (Night and Fog Decree), under which persons who 
committed offenses against the Reich or the German forces in occupied territories, 
except where the death sentence was certain, were to be taken secretly to Germany 
and handed over to the SIPO and SD for trial or punishment in Germany. This 
decree was signed by the Defendant Keitel. After these civilians arrived in 
Germany, no word of them was permitted to reach the country from which they 
came, or their relatives; even in cases when they died awaiting trial the families 
were not informed, the purpose being to create anxiety in the minds of the family of 
the arrested person. Hitler’s purpose in issuing this decree was stated by the 
Defendant Keitel in a covering letter, dated 12 December 1941, to be as follows: 
‘Efficient and enduring intimidation can only be achieved either by capital 
punishment or by measures by which the relatives of the criminal and the 
population do not know the fate of the criminal. This aim is achieved when the 
criminal is transferred to Germany.”8 
Because Nacht und Nebel was charged as a war crime, the International 
Military Tribunal did not rule on whether it could also be characterized as a 
crime against humanity. 
However, the International Military Tribunal’s findings were subsequently 
invoked and relied upon by the American Military Tribunal in the ‘Justice Case’ 
where the charge was crimes against humanity. This was a prosecution of 
leading judges and prosecutors for their implementation of Nazi decrees 
including Nacht und Nebel.9 The judges considered the brief account by the 
International Military Tribunal to be sufficient to show ‘the illegality and cruelty 
of the entire NN plan or scheme’.10 The Nacht und Nebel Erlass was described in 
the indictment of the Nazi jurists under the heading ‘War Crimes’: 
“Hitler’s decree of "Night and Fog" (Nacht und Nebel) whereby civilians of 
occupied territories who had been accused of crimes of resistance against 
occupying forces were spirited away for secret trial by certain Special Courts of 
                                                                          
7 United States of America v. Alstötter et al., Extracts from the Testimony of Prosecution Witness 
Rudolf Lehmann, (1951) 3 TWC 804, at p. 805. 
8 France et al. v. Goering et al., Judgment, 30 September-1 October 1946, (1947) 1 IMT 171, at pp. 
232-233. 
9 United States of America v. Alstötter et al., Opinion and Judgment, 4 January 1947, (1951) 3 TWC 
954, at p. 1033. 
10 Ibid., p. 1034. 
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the Justice Ministry within the Reich, in the course of which the victims’ 
whereabouts, trial, and subsequent disposition were kept completely secret, thus 
serving the dual purpose of terrorizing the victims’ relatives and associates and 
barring recourse to any evidence, witnesses, or counsel for defense.”11 
In establishing the illegality of Nacht und Nebel, the Tribunal referred to the 
list of violations of the laws and customs of war that appears in the report of the 
Commission on Responsibilities, issued during the Paris Peace Conference in 
1919, noting that this included ‘deportation of civilians’. The Tribunal found that 
this crime was subsequently reflected in Control Council Law No. 10, where the 
definition of crimes against humanity included acts of ‘enslavement, deportation, 
imprisonment … against any civilian population.12 It continued, noting that 
Nacht und Nebel prisoners 
“Were kept secretly and not permitted to communicate in any manner with their 
friends and relatives. This is inhumane treatment. It was meted out not only to the 
prisoners themselves but to their friends and relatives back home who were in 
constant distress of mind as to their whereabouts and fate. The families were 
deprived-of the support of the husband, thus causing suffering and hunger. The 
purpose of the spiriting away of persons under the Night and Fog decree was to 
deliberately create constant fear and anxiety among the families, friends, and 
relatives as to the fate of the deportees. Thus, cruel punishment was meted out to 
the families and friends without any charge or claim that they actually did anything 
in violation of any occupation rule of the army or of any crime against the Reich. 
It is clear that mental cruelty may be inflicted as well as physical cruelty. Such was 
the express purpose of the NN decree, and thousands of innocent persons were so 
penalized by its enforcement.”13  
Convicting several of the Nazi jurists for their role in implementation of the 
Nacht und Nebel decree, the Tribunal said that it was acting ‘in harmony with the 
decision’ of the International Military Tribunal in finding ‘that the secret 
procedure which was instituted and enforced through the Ministry of Justice 
constituted a war crime and a crime against humanity’.14 Rudolf Lehman, the 
military lawyer who drafted the decree, was found guilty of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity in another trial for being ‘a participant of the final 
production of this terror programme’.15 
                                                                          
11 United States of America v. Alstötter et al., Indictment, 4 January 1947, (1951) 3 TWC 15, para. 13. 
12 United States of America v. Alstötter et al., Opinion and Judgment, 4 January 1947, (1951) 3 TWC 
954, at p. 1057. 
13 Ibid., p. 1058. 
14 Ibid., p. 1120. 
15 United States of America v. Von Leeb et al.(‘The High Command Case’), Judgment, 27 October 
1948, (1950) 11 LWC 462, at p. 694. 
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II. THE CODE OF CRIMES  
AND THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 
The issue of enforced disappearance returned to the international human rights 
agenda in the 1980s as a result of its widespread practice in Latin America.16 
In a seminal ruling, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights found that the 
information before it, provided by the Inter-American Commission, tended to 
show that ‘there existed in Honduras from 1981 to 1984 a systematic and 
selective practice of disappearances carried out with the assistance or tolerance 
of the government’.17 The Court noted that ‘[i]nternational practice and doctrine 
have often categorized disappearances as a crime against humanity, although 
there is no treaty in force which is applicable to the States Parties to the 
Convention and which uses this terminology’.18 It also cited a resolution of the 
General Assembly of the Organisation of American States declaring that 
disappearance is ‘an affront to the conscience of the hemisphere and constitutes a 
crime against humanity’.19 
Introduction of the notion of disappearance as an explicit category of crime 
against humanity is probably attributable to Professor Christian Tomuschat at the 
1991 session of the International Law Commission, during consideration of the 
Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. The Code had 
by then been debated within the Commission for more than four decades. On 
the proposal of the Special Rapporteur, Doudou Thiam, at the 1991 session the 
Commission had actually agreed to abandon the term ‘crimes against humanity’ 
in favour of ‘systematic or mass violations of human rights’, a temporary 
aberration that it would soon abandon.20 Professor Tomuschat observed that 
‘the practice of systematic disappearances in certain countries was at present one 
of the main concerns with regard to human rights’. He said that it was not 
possible at the current stage of the debate to add ‘systematic disappearance’ to 
the provision, noting that it might be covered by the fifth sub-paragraph of the 
draft, dealing with persecution, adding that the question should be mentioned in 
the commentary and that the Commission should return to it on second reading.21 
The commentary of the 1991 draft code contains the following: ‘It was pointed 
out in the Commission that a practice of systematic disappearances of persons 
                                                                          
16 Report submitted by Mr. Manfred Nowak, independent expert charged with examining the existing 
international criminal and human rights framework for the protection of persons from enforced or 
involuntary disappearances, pursuant to paragraph 11 of Commission resolution 2001/46, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/2002/71, paras. 11-15. Also: Maureen R. Berman and Roger S. Clark, ‘State Terrorism: 
Disappearances’, (1982) 13 Rutgers L.J. 531. 
17 Velázquez Rodriquez v. Honduras, 29 July 1988, Series C, no. 4, para. 119. 
18 Ibid., para. 153. Also: Godinez Cruz v. Honduras, 20 January 1989, Series C, no. 8, para. 161. 
19 AG/RES. 666 (XIII-O/83), in Twelfth Regular Session, November 14-18 1993, OEA/Ser. 
P/XIII.O.2, Proceedings, Vol. I, p. 68.  
20 Ninth report on the draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, by Mr. 
Doudou Thiam, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/CN.4/435 and Add.l,  
21 Yearbook … 1991, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1991, p. 219, para. 75. 
Epreuves du 26 juin 2017 
Manuscrit en construction ne pas tenir compte de la pagination
© Editions A. PEDONE 
William A. SCHABAS 
438 
was also a phenomenon that deserved to be specifically mentioned in the draft 
Code.’22 In its observations on the 1991 draft Code, Australia endorsed the 
suggestion of Professor Tomuschat ‘that the practice of systematic 
disappearances of persons deserves special mention in the context of this draft 
article’. Australia added that it was ‘not certain that persecution on social, 
political, racial, religious or cultural grounds would cover the practice of 
systematic disappearances’.23 
Special Rapporteur Doudou Thiam submitted a revised draft code in 1995. He 
returned to the heading ‘crimes against humanity’, commenting on its use in the 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.24 He 
did not refer to the suggestion that disappearance be added to the list of 
punishable acts. Professor Tomuschat again took up the issue: ‘The list of crimes 
should be re-examined with a view to re-moving some of them and adding 
others, in particular enforced disappearances.’25 Several members of the 
Commission voiced support, including Francisco Villagrán Kramer,26 Andreas 
Jacovides,27 and Edmundo Vargas Carreño, who said that 
“certain omissions from the list of crimes must be made good. He had in mind 
primarily enforced disappearances, which constituted one of the most serious 
crimes of the second half of the twentieth century in some parts of the world. 
Pursuant to State policy, thousands of persons had disappeared after arrest. The 
press had published the confession of the current Chilean Commander-in-Chief 
who had acknowledged ordering the arrest and execution of thousands of people 
whose bodies had then been dumped at sea. Those were very serious violations of 
human rights which truly constituted crimes against the peace and security of 
mankind and should be mentioned in the draft Code.”28 
Vargas Carreño explained that enforced disappearance should be a crime 
‘when committed by persons enjoying the protection or authorization of a State’, 
adding that ‘[t]he seriousness of a crime which justified inclusion in the Code lay 
precisely in the fact that it was committed by someone enjoying the protection or 
the consent of the State’.29 He said the essential point was that perpetrators 
enjoyed impunity because they had the support or acquiescence of government 
organs and were acting, for all legal purposes, as agents of a State. The other 
essential point was that, following the kidnapping or arrest, the government 
authorities refused to provide information on the fate or whereabouts of the 
victim.’30 
                                                                          
22 Yearbook ... 1991, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1991/Add.l (Part 2), p. 104, para. (10). 
23 Yearbook … 1993, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1993/Add.l (Part 1), p. 65, para. 35. 
24 Yearbook … 1995, UN Doc. UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1995/Add.l (Part 2), p. 44, paras. 82-85. 
25 Yearbook … 1995, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1995, p. 43, para. 6. 
26 Yearbook … 1995, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1995, p. 44, para. 10. 
27 Yearbook … 1995, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1995, p. 21, para. 14. 
28 Yearbook … 1995, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1995, p. 17, para. 28. 
29 Yearbook … 1995, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1995, p. 33, para. 10. 
30 Yearbook … 1995, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1995, p. 34, para. 12. 
Epreuves du 26 juin 2017 
Manuscrit en construction ne pas tenir compte de la pagination
© Editions A. PEDONE 
Mélanges en l’honneur d’Emmanuel Decaux 
439 
The draft Code proposed by the Drafting Committee at the 1996 session of the 
International Law Commission included ‘forced disappearance of persons’ as a 
distinct crime against humanity.31 The Chairman of the Drafting Committee, 
Carlos Calero Rodrigues, explained that forced disappearance was listed 
explicitly ‘in view of the fact of the rather wide commission of the crime and 
taking into account the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 47/133 
and the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearances of Persons’.32 
The commentary cited the definitions that these instruments advanced for 
enforced disappearance, explaining that ‘[t]he term “forced disappearance of 
persons” is used as a term of art to refer to the type of criminal conduct which is 
addressed in the Declaration and the Convention’. The commentary said that 
forced disappearance was included in the definition of crimes against humanity 
‘because of its extreme cruelty and gravity’.33 
III. THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted in July 1998 
also lists ‘enforced disappearance of persons’ in article 7(1) as a distinct act of 
crime against humanity.34 Some but not all of the acts of crime against humanity 
enumerated in the Statute benefit from further definition. Accordingly, article 
7(2)(i) specifies:  
“Enforced disappearance of persons’ means the arrest, detention or abduction of 
persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a 
political organisation, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of 
freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with 
the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged 
period of time.” 
The definition has been described as ‘loosely based’ on that of the 1992 
General Assembly Declaration.35 The Rome Statute also provides general 
contextual elements for crimes against humanity, applicable to all of the distinct 
punishable acts. Thus, a crime against humanity must be committed ‘as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with 
knowledge of the attack’.36 Moreover, ‘”[a]ttack directed against any civilian 
population” means a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of 
                                                                          
31 Yearbook …1996, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1996, p. 33. 
32 Yearbook …1996, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1996, p. 57. 
33 Yearbook…1996, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.l (Part 2), p. 50. 
34 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (2002) 2187 UNTS 90. 
35 Herman von Hebel and Darryl Robinson, ‘The Elements of Crimes Against Humanity’, in Roy S. 
Lee, ed., The International Criminal Court, The Making of the Rome Statute, Issues, Negotiations, 
Results, The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1999, pp. 57–108, at p. 102. 
36 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (2002) 2187 UNTS 90, art. 7(1). 
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acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in 
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack’.37 
In accordance with article 9 of the Statute, the definitions of crimes receive 
more elaborate treatment in the Elements of Crimes, a document that was only 
finalised nearly two years after the Rome Conference.38 Often, the Elements of 
Crimes are little more than a banal reformulation of the terms of the Statute. 
However, this is not the case for the crime against humanity of enforced 
disappearance, where a rather elaborate text accompanied, unusually, by four 
footnotes, is proposed: 
“Elements 
1. The perpetrator: 
(a) Arrested, detained25 26 or abducted one or more persons; or 
(b) Refused to acknowledge the arrest, detention or abduction, or to give 
information on the fate or whereabouts of such person or persons. 
2. (a) Such arrest, detention or abduction was followed or accompanied by a 
refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the 
fate or whereabouts of such person or persons; or 
(b) Such refusal was preceded or accompanied by that deprivation of freedom. 
3. The perpetrator was aware that:27 
(a) Such arrest, detention or abduction would be followed in the ordinary course of 
events by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give 
information on the fate or whereabouts of such person or persons;28 or 
(b) Such refusal was preceded or accompanied by that deprivation of freedom. 
4. Such arrest, detention or abduction was carried out by, or with the 
authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization. 
5. Such refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information 
on the fate or whereabouts of such person or persons was carried out by, or with 
the authorization or support of, such State or political organization. 
6. The perpetrator intended to remove such person or persons from the protection 
of the law for a prolonged period of time. 
7. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against a civilian population. 
8. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be 
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. 
25 The word ‘detained’ would include a perpetrator who maintained an existing 
detention. 
26 It is understood that under certain circumstances an arrest or detention may 
have been lawful. 
27 This element, inserted because of the complexity of this crime, is without 
prejudice to the General Introduction to the Elements of Crimes. 
                                                                          
37 Ibid., art. 7(2)(a). 
38 Finalized draft text of the Elements of Crimes, UN Doc. PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.2. 
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28 It is understood that, in the case of a perpetrator who maintained an existing 
detention, this element would be satisfied if the perpetrator was aware that such a 
refusal had already taken place.” 
The Elements of Crimes are part of the applicable law, pursuant to article 
21(1), and are to ‘assist the Court in the interpretation and application’ of the 
subject-matter provisions of the Rome Statute, including article 7.39 Whether 
they are binding, in the absence of clear conflict with the Statute itself, remains a 
matter of dispute.40 At the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, where the Elements of Crimes have been invoked to assist in 
identifying the content of customary international law, judges have been quite 
dismissive of their significance.41 
The initial draft of the Rome Statute was submitted to the United Nations 
General Assembly by the International Law Commission in 1994. It listed 
‘crimes against humanity’ within the subject-matter jurisdiction but did not 
provide a list of punishable acts.42 Reference was made to earlier definitions, in 
the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, the Commission’s own draft 
code of 1991, and the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia. Some members of the Commission had argued that apartheid 
be included in the list but there is no mention in the report of the Commission of 
enforced disappearance.43 
The General Assembly constituted an Ad Hoc Committee for further study of 
the draft, this time at the political and not the expert level. In that forum, the 
International Commission on Jurists proposed that enforced disappearance be 
added to the definition of crimes against humanity.44 Acting on the report of the 
Ad Hoc Committee, the General Assembly constituted a Preparatory Committee 
for further work on the draft statute. The Preparatory Committee met in several 
sessions over the course of 1996, 1997 and early 1998. Other NGOs joined the 
International Commission of Jurists in calling for an explicit reference to 
enforced disappearance in the provision on crimes against humanity.45 The 1996 
report of the Preparatory Committee contained a draft proposal for a crime 
against humanity defined as ‘kidnapping followed by the disappearance of the 
                                                                          
39 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (2002) 2187 UNTS 90, art. 9. 
40 Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest 
against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 4 March 2009, paras. 117–133; Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), 
Separate and Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Ušacka, 4 March 2009, para. 17. 
41 Krstić (IT-98-33-A), Judgment, 19 April 2004, para. 224, fn. 366. Also: Milutinović et al. (IT-05-
87-T), Judgment, Volume 1 of 4, 26 February 2009, para. 196, fn. 354. 
42 UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.l (Part2), p. 38. 
43 Ibid., pp. 38-41. 
44 International Commission of Jurists, Third ICJ Position Paper, August 1995. 
45 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, A Position Paper of the Lawyers Committee for Human 
Rights August 1996/Updated. 
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person’.46 Although the record is silent on the authorship, years later this was 
claimed by Argentina, together with Chile.47 
In February 1997, the Preparatory Committee’s Working Group on the 
definitions of crimes incorporated ‘enforced disappearance of persons’ in the 
enumeration of crimes against humanity.48 Moreover, the Working Group 
proposed a detailed definition that was taken verbatim from the third preambular 
paragraph of the 1992 General Assembly resolution: 
“enforced disappearance of persons means when persons are arrested, detained or 
abducted against their will or otherwise deprived of their liberty by officials of 
different branches or levels of government, or by organized groups or private 
individuals acting on behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or 
acquiescence of the Government, followed by a refusal to disclose the fate or 
whereabouts of the persons concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation 
of their liberty, which places such persons outside the protection of the law.”49 
A proposal for a definition of crimes against humanity from France also 
contained a distinct paragraph for ‘[f]orced disappearance of persons’ but 
without any attempt at detailed definition50  
A consolidated text emerged with a paragraph on ‘enforced disappearance of 
persons’, accompanied by a footnote: ‘It was suggested that some more time was 
needed to reflect upon the inclusion of this subparagraph.’51 The consolidated 
text also included two alternative proposals for a definitional paragraph: 
“[‘enforced disappearance of persons’ means when persons are arrested, detained 
or abducted against their will by or with the authorization, support or 
acquiescence of the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to 
acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or 
whereabouts of those persons, thereby placing them outside the protection of the 
law]  
[‘enforced disappearance of persons’ as defined in the Inter-American Convention 
on the Forced Disappearance of Persons of 9 June 1994, as referred to in the 
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance 
(General Assembly resolution 47/133 of 18 December 1992)].” 
The first of the two texts draws upon language used in both the General 
Assembly Declaration and the Inter-American Convention but it also contains 
novel elements, notably the reference to ‘political organisation’. The second text 
appears to equate the crime against humanity of enforced disappearance with the 
definition of enforced disappearance in the earlier instruments, although the 
                                                                          
46 Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Vol. 
II (Compilation of Proposals), UN Doc. A/51/22, p. 69. 
47 Note verbale of Argentina, 2 October 2000, reproduced in: Question of enforced or involuntary 
disappearances, Note by the secretariat, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2001/69, pp. 4-5. 
48 UN Doc. A/AC.249/1997/WG.1/CRP.3, p. 2. 
49 Ibid. 
50 UN Doc. A/AC.249/1997/WG.1/CRP.4. 
51 UN Doc. A/AC.249/1997/WG.1/CRP.5, p. 2. Also: UN Doc. A/AC.249/1997/L.5, pp. 5-6. 
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latter were quite explicit in distinguishing between enforced disappearance in 
general and enforced disappearance as a crime against humanity, where 
‘systematic practice’ was required.52 
The alternative drafts remained unchanged until through the remaining sessions 
of the Preparatory Committee.53 At the final meeting, in April 1998, the second 
option of the definitional paragraph, referring to the Inter-American Convention 
and the General Assembly Declaration, was removed.54 Shortly before the 
Conference, the United States issued a document entitled ‘Elements of offences 
for the International Criminal Court’. Presented as ‘an illustration of how a set of 
criminal elements, annexed to the Statute, might appear’, it included ‘enforced 
disappearance of persons’ within the definition of crimes against humanity but 
did not attempt to provide detailed elements.55 
At the Rome Conference some delegations expressed support for inclusion of 
enforced disappearance within the definition of crimes against humanity.56 It was 
argued that in any event it would be subsumed within ‘other inhumane acts’, and 
that it was better to include the crime explicitly.57 But the view was not 
unanimous. Syria’s representative said ‘that the wording “enforced 
disappearance of persons” in paragraph 1(i) was unclear because it could be used 
in reference to liberation movements fighting for their freedom and to regain 
their territory’.58 India and Russia opposed inclusion of enforced 
disappearance.59 The United Kingdom said it would be happy to include the 
crime ‘if the definition was clear’, adding that the definitions in paragraph 2 
might assist in reaching agreement on enforced disappearance.60 Likewise, 
Mexico said that enforced disappearance ‘would benefit from a definition’.61 
Summarizing the initial debates in the Committee of the Whole, the Chairman 
said that ‘[s]ubparagraph (i) on enforced disappearance of persons had given rise 
to more substantive comments, which would have to be addressed in due 
course’.62 
                                                                          
52 Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, UN Doc. 
A/RES/47/133, preambular paragraph 4; Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of 
Persons, preambular paragraph 6;  
53 Report of the Intersessional Meeting from 19 to 30 January 1998 in Zutphen, The Netherlands, UN 
Doc. A/AC.249/1998/L.13, pp. 33-34; UN Doc. A/AC.249/1998/CRP.8, pp. 17-18. 
54 UN Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1, pp. 26-27. 
55 Proposal submitted by the United States of America, Elements of offences for the International 
Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/AC.249/1998/DP.11. 
56 UN Doc. A/CONF.183/SR.3, para. 74 (Costa Rica); UN Doc. A/CONF.183/SR.4, para. 66 (Chile); 
UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.3, para. 105 (Jordan); A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.4 (Chile). 
57 Herman von Hebel and Darryl Robinson, ‘The Elements of Crimes Against Humanity’, in S. Roy 
Lee, ed., op.cit. ft. 35, pp. 57–108, at p. 102. 
58 UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.3, para. 23. 
59 Ibid., para. 47 (India); UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.4, para. 6 (Russia). 
60 UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.3, para. 91. For a similar view: UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.4, 
para. 17 (Japan). 
61 UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.3, para. 125. 
62 Ibid., para. 177. 
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On 6 July 1998, with less than two weeks remaining in the Conference, the 
Bureau issued a discussion paper with a view to resolving some of the most 
contentious issues. The provision on crimes against humanity proposed by the 
Bureau included enforced disappearance and was accompanied by a definitional 
paragraph, changed slightly from the version of the Preparatory Committee by 
addition of the words ‘for a prolonged period of time’.63 No further changes were 
made to what became article 7(2)(i) in the final version of the Rome Statute 
Only when the Elements of Crimes were being prepared, in 1998 and 1999, did 
the complexities of definition of the crime against humanity of enforced 
disappearance become fully apparent. Negotiations of the Elements in the 
Preparatory Commission were ‘intensive and controversial’.64 The starting point 
in the preparation of the Elements of Crimes was a draft proposed by the United 
States in early 1999.65 It covered the abduction component of disappearance but 
said nothing about the refusal to provide information.66 Several Arab States 
submitted an alternative that required participation by the suspect at both stages 
of perpetration.67 Canada and Germany put out a revised draft that presented the 
crime in two stages, the first being the arrest, detention or abduction, followed by 
the ‘circumstance’ of a refusal of information.68 All three proposals were deemed 
to be too narrow.69 Eventually, a consensus draft emerged reflecting ‘a bifurcated 
structure for most of the elements, which is unique to the elements on enforced 
disappearance’.70 
The Elements of Crimes makes clear the two-dimensional aspect of the actus 
reus of enforced disappearance, and the possibility that the perpetrator 
participate in only one stage and not the other. Nevertheless, the suspect must 
have knowledge of the circumstances of the crime as a whole. Someone who 
conducted an abduction without awareness that any subsequent deprivation of 
liberty would be denied by the authorities could not be convicted of the crime. 
Indeed, the initial deprivation of liberty, through arrest rather than abduction, 
                                                                          
63 Bureau: discussion paper regarding part 2, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.53. Also: 
Recommendations of the Coordinator regarding article 5, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.44; Bureau: 
proposal regarding part 2, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.59. 
64 Georg Witschel and Wiebke Rückert, ‘Article 7(1)(i) – Crime Against Humanity of Enforced 
Disappearance of Persons’, in Roy S. Lee, ed., The International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes 
and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2001, pp. 98-103, 
at p. 99. 
65 Proposal submitted by the United States, Draft elements of crimes, Addendum, UN Doc. 
PCNICC/1999/DP.4/Add.1, p. 8. 
66 Georg Witschel and Wiebke Rückert, ‘Article 7(1)(i) – Crime Against Humanity of Enforced 
Disappearance of Persons’, in Roy S. Lee, ed., op. cit. ft. 64, pp. 98-103, at p. 100. 
67 Proposal submitted by Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and United Arab Emirates concerning the 
elements of crimes against humanity, UN Doc. PCNICC/1999/WGEC/DP.39, p. 4. 
68 Proposal submitted by Canada and Germany on article 7, UN Doc. PCNICC/1999/WGEC/DP.36. 
69 Georg Witschel and Wiebke Rückert, ‘Article 7(1)(i) – Crime Against Humanity of Enforced 
Disappearance of Persons’, in Roy S. Lee, ed., op. cit. ft. 64, pp. 98-103, at p. 100. 
70 Ibid. 
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may be lawful in itself, as footnote 26 to the Elements explains.71 A difference in 
the English and French versions of article 7(2)(i) explains a clarification in the 
Elements of Crimes. The English text of article 7(2)(i) refers to ‘the 
authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization’ 
whereas the French text speaks of ‘l’autorisation, l’appui ou l’assentiment de cet 
État ou de cette organisation’. Paragraph 4 of the Elements confirms that this 
phrase applies only to the arrest, detention or abduction. Paragraph 5 indicates 
that for the second stage, the refusal to acknowledge, mere acquiescence is not 
sufficient.72 
There has been no significant interpretation of article 7(2)(i) of the Rome 
Statute and of the associated Elements in the case law of the International 
Criminal Court. The Prosecutor’s application to the Pre-Trial Chamber for 
authorisation to begin an investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte 
d’Ivoire included allegations, largely based on a Human Rights Watch report73 
with corroboration from Amnesty International and UN observers,74 that crimes 
against humanity of enforced disappearance had been perpetrated75 ‘on a large 
scale’.76 Authorising the investigation in accordance with article 15(3) of the 
Rome Statute, the Pre-Trial Chamber concluded that there was a reasonable basis 
to believe that pro-Gbagbo forces were responsible for enforced 
disappearances.77 However, the crime has not actually been charged in the three 
Côte d’Ivoire cases before the Court.78 The Prosecutor has also pointed to 
allegations of enforced disappearance in situations under preliminary 
examination in Guinea79 and Honduras,80 pursuant to article 15(1) and (2) of the 
Statute. 
                                                                          
71 Georg Witschel and Wiebke Rückert, ‘Article 7(1)(i) – Crime Against Humanity of Enforced 
Disappearance of Persons’, in Roy S. Lee, ed., op. cit. ft. 64, pp. 98-103, at p. 101. 
72 Ibid., p. 102. 
73 Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire (ICC-02/11), Request for authorisation of an 
investigation pursuant to article 15, 23 June 2011, paras. 84, 100, 111, 128. 
74 Ibid., 127. 
75 Ibid., paras. 3, 39, 113, 117. 
76 Ibid., para. 58 
77 Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire (ICC-02/11), Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the 
Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte 
d’Ivoire, para. 82. 
78 Gbagbo, Simone (ICC-02/11-01/12), Warrant of Arrest for Simone Gbagbo, 29 February 2012, 
para. 7; Gbagbo, Laurent et al. (ICC-02/11-01/11, ICC-02/11- 02/11), Decision on Prosecution 
requests to join the cases of The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and The Prosecutor v. Charles Blé 
Goudé and related matters, 11 March 2015, para. 53, fn. 111. 
79 Report of the International Criminal Court on its activities in 2014/15, UN Doc. A/70/350, para. 
111. 
80 Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2014, 2 December 2014, 
para. 35 ; Office of the Prosecutor, Situation in Honduras, Article 5 Report, October 2015, paras. 25, 
128,  
Epreuves du 26 juin 2017 
Manuscrit en construction ne pas tenir compte de la pagination
© Editions A. PEDONE 
William A. SCHABAS 
446 
IV. ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME  
AGAINST HUMANITY OF ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE 
Article 7(2)(i) of the Rome Statute combined with the Elements of Crimes 
provides a thorough codification of the crime against humanity of enforced 
disappearance. Lacking the authority of judicial decisions, their application and 
interpretation remain uncertain. As is the case with other international crimes, 
there is room for dispute as to whether the codified text may be broader or 
narrower than the definition of the crime under customary international law. The 
question is of little or no interest in prosecutions under the Rome Statute, where 
the applicable law is clearly set out in relevant texts. However, the validity of 
definitions of international crimes is a question that may arise in other contexts: 
in domestic courts, where legislation may suggest the relevance of customary 
international law; at other international criminal tribunals; in international human 
rights courts where the nullum crimen sine lege principle is at issue; and in 
international adjudication of issues such as the obligation to try or extradite, 
the prohibition of statutory limitation, and the rejection of immunities. 
Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute demands that the attack on a civilian 
population be ‘pursuant to a State or organizational policy’. It applies to 
prosecutions for all crimes against humanity including enforced disappearance. 
This policy element has been dismissed by judges at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia as being inconsistent with customary 
international law, which judges of the Tribunal invoke in the interpretation of the 
provisions of their Statute.81 Nevertheless, it is relatively clear that the drafters of 
the Rome Statute considered that they were codifying existing customary 
international law with respect to crimes against humanity rather than engaging in 
its progressive development.82 To that extent, the consensus reached by some 
160 States provides persuasive evidence of customary international law. National 
judges, in the application and interpretation of domestic legal provisions on 
crimes against humanity, may be torn between the very different perspectives on 
the policy element taken by the Yugoslavia Tribunal and the International 
Criminal Court. 
Within the International Criminal Court itself there has been some debate about 
the policy element set out in article 7(2)(a), essentially with respect to the scope 
of the term ‘organisational’. At one extreme is the position adopted by the late 
Judge Hans-Peter Kaul who said that ‘organisational policy’ should be confined 
to organisations that are ‘State-like’.83 At the other are the views of Judge Chile 
                                                                          
81 Kunarac et al. (IT-96-23/1-A), Judgment, 12 June 2002, para. 95. 
82 Darryl Robinson, ‘Defining “Crimes Against Humanity” at the Rome Conference’, (1999) 93 
American Journal of International Law 43, at p. 55. 
83 Situation in the Republic of Kenya (ICC-01/09), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hans-Peter Kaul, 
31 March 2010 ; Muthaura et al. (ICC-01/09-02/11), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hans-Peter Kaul, 
23 January 2012. 
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Eboe-Osuji, who virtually ignores the policy element altogether.84 Several judges 
have held that the organisation need not be State-like although they have 
endeavoured to retain flexibility and resisted identifying organisations that would 
not fall within the terms of the Statute.85 
The Committee on Enforced Disappearances has reminded States of their 
obligation under the Convention to incorporate the crime against humanity of 
enforced disappearance within domestic legislation.86 It has criticised them for 
including requirements that are not found in the Convention, such as a requirement 
that the offence be committed ‘as part of a concerted plan’.87 But whether 
compliance with the Convention is achieved by incorporating the Rome Statute 
definition, accompanied by the ‘State or organisational policy’ element, or whether 
it requires the broader approach whereby there is no policy requirement, a view 
defended by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia as one 
that is consistent with customary international law, remains unsettled. There may 
also be debate about the references to ‘political organisation’, the intention of 
removing victims from the protection of the law, and the reference to ‘a prolonged 
period of time’. Furthermore there are the additional details added to the text of 
article 7(2)(i) as a result of the Elements of Crimes. 
The issue of State or organisational policy takes on special features when the 
crime against humanity of enforced disappearance is concerned because of 
explicit references that must be added to the more general formulation in article 
7(2)(a). Article 7(2)(i) appears to limit the crime to the acts of a State or ‘a 
political organisation’. In this respect, the definition is probably more extensive 
than that of the 1992 General Assembly Declaration. The 1992 Declaration 
contemplated a role for ‘non-State actors’ but only to the extent that they were 
acting directly or indirectly for a State. This may explain the comment by 
Antonio Cassese who provided enforced disappearance as an example of crime 
against humanity set out in article 7 that is ‘broader than customary international 
law’ and an ‘expansion’ of ‘general international law’.88 The Rome Statute 
                                                                          
84 Ruto et al. (ICC- 01/09-01/11), Reasons of Judge Eboe-Osuji, 5 April 2016. 
85 Situation in the Republic of Kenya (ICC-01/09), Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome 
Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, 
31 March 2010, para. 93 ; Prosecutor v. Ruto et al. (ICC-01/09-01/11), Decision on the Confirmation 
of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, 23 January 2012, para. 185; 
Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire (ICC-02/11), Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome 
Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, 
3 October 2011, para. 46; Katanga (ICC-01/04-01/07), Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, 
7 March 2014, paras. 1119-1120. For an overview of the case law of the Court, see: First report on 
crimes against humanity, by Sean D. Murphy, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/CN.4/680, paras. 147-
151. 
86 Report of the Committee on Enforced Disappearances, Seventh session (15-26 September 2014), 
Eighth session (2-13 February 2015), UN Doc. A/70/56, para. 5. 
87 Report of the Committee on Enforced Disappearances, Third session (29 October–9 November 
2012), Fourth session (8–19 April 2013), UN Doc. A/68/56, pp. 15-16. 
88 Antonio Cassese, ‘Crimes against humanity’, in Antonio Cassese, The Oxford Companion to 
International Criminal Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 353-378, at p. 376. For a 
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definition is nevertheless narrower than that of the 2006 International 
Convention, where article 3 – a provision that is not without its own ambiguities 
– envisages perpetration of enforced disappearance by ‘persons or groups of 
persons acting without the authorisation, support or acquiescence of the State’. 
Under the Rome Statute, non-State actors may commit the crime against 
humanity of enforced disappearance to the extent that they are associated with ‘a 
political organisation’. The distinction between the definition of enforced 
disappearance in the two instruments has been noticed by the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee.89 
The term ‘political organisation’ is not defined in the Elements of Crimes and 
nothing in the travaux préparatoires assists in its interpretation. Clearly, because 
of the modifier ‘political’ not any organization can be considered. The words 
‘political organisation’ do not seem to be very far removed from the ‘State-like 
organisation’ invoked by Judge Kaul, and might be taken to confirm his 
approach to crimes against humanity as a whole. The term would not apply to a 
‘criminal organisation’ although there are surely some cases where the line 
between the criminal and the political is hard to discern. For Yann Jurovics, use 
of the term ‘apporte alors une certaine restriction, en excluant probablement de la 
répression les disparitions imputables aux organisations non politiques mais par 
exemple militaires ou mafieuses’.90 According to Kai Ambos, ‘[g]iven that one 
of the legal interests protected by the crime of enforced disappearance is the 
effective access to the administration of justice (or any legal remedy), the 
offence can only refer to organisations that can grant such an access’.91 For 
Christopher K. Hall and Larissa van den Herik, ‘the crime of enforced 
disappearance is premised on the performance of state functions’, although they 
concede that ‘[p]erhaps other acts of crimes against humanity are more amenable 
to a certain privatization’.92 Philippe Currat has proposed that ‘political 
organisation’ be interpreted broadly so as to encompass all groups capable of 
committing the crime of enforced disappearance,93 but this formulation seems 
somewhat tautological. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
contrary view, see Brian Finucane, ‘Enforced Disappearance as a Crime Under International Law: A 
Neglected Origin in the Laws of War’, (2010) 35 Yale J Int’l L 171. 
89 Durić et al. v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (No. 1956/2010), UN Doc. CCPR/C/111/D/1956/2010, 
para. 9.3, fn. 21; Tija Hero et al. v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (No. 1966/2010), UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/112/D/1966/2010, para. 9.3, fn. 16. 
90 Yann Jurovics, ‘Article 7’, in Julian Fernandez and Xavier Pacreau, dir., Statut de Rome de la Cour 
pénale internationale, Commentaire article par articles, Paris : Pedone, 2012, pp. 417-480, at p. 452. 
91 Kai Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law, Volume II: The Crimes and Sentencing, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 111. 
92 Christopher K. Hall and Larissa van den Herik, ‘Crimes against humanity’, in Otto Triffterer and 
Kai Ambos, eds., Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Observers’ 
Notes, Article by Article, 3rd edn., Munich: C.H. Beck, Baden-Baden: Nomos, Oxford: Hart, 2015, 
pp. 130-280, at p. 268. 
93 Philippe Currat, Les crimes contre l’humanité dans le statut de la Cour pénale international, Paris : 
LGDJ, 2006, at p. 512. 
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When the 2006 Convention was being drafted there was some anxiety about 
the relationship its definition of enforced disappearance might have with that of 
the Rome Statute. Canada, then at the zenith of its enthusiasm for international 
human rights law, initially opposed the whole idea of a convention out of 
concern this might ‘undermine’ the Rome Statute system.94 The drafters of the 
Convention considered including a reference to ‘political organisation’.95 On the 
proposal of the Chairman of the Working Group, instead of such a reference a 
provision that became article 3 was adopted.96 
That there are manifestations of enforced disappearance that do not fall within 
the rubric of crimes against humanity can hardly be disputed. Both the Preamble 
and article 5 of the 2006 Convention makes this quite clear. Using language 
borrowed from the chapeau of article 7(1) of the Rome Statute, the Convention 
equates the ‘widespread or systematic practice of enforced disappearance’ with 
crimes against humanity. Such succinct formulations are a bit of an 
oversimplification because they tend to conceal the debate about the policy 
element. Tracing the line between the crime against humanity of enforced 
disappearance and other forms of enforced disappearance involves determining 
whether the approach of the Rome Statute or that of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is authoritative. 
In its General Comment on crimes against humanity, the Working Group on 
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances referred favourably to article 7(1) of the 
Rome Statute but ignored entirely the policy element in article 7(2)(a) and the 
‘political organisation’ element in article 7(2)(i). The reference to the Kunarac 
decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which 
is not about enforced disappearance but which is authority for the absence of any 
policy requirement, hints at the Working Group’s perspective.97 A similar 
inference may be drawn from a comment by the chairman of the drafting 
committee of the International Law Commission, Matthias Forteau, in 
explanation of paragraph 4 of the definition of crimes against humanity adopted 
on first reading at the 2015 session. It states: ‘This draft article is without 
prejudice to any broader definition provided for in any international instrument 
or national law.’98 Professor Forteau made explicit reference to the 2006 
Convention: 
                                                                          
94 Note verbale of 28 November 2000, in Question of enforced or involuntary disappearances, Note 
by the secretariat, Addendum, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2001/69/Add.1, p. 2. 
95 Report of the intersessional open-ended working group to elaborate a draft legally binding 
normative instrument for the protection of all persons from enforced disappearance, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/2004/59, para. 30. 
96 Ibid., para. 35. See also: Report of the Intersessional Open-ended Working Group to elaborate a 
draft legally binding normative instrument for the protection of all persons from enforced 
disappearance, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/57, para. 12-15. 
97 General comment on enforced disappearance as a crime against humanity, UN Doc. A/HRC/13/31, 
para. 39. 
98 Crimes against humanity, Text of draft articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 provisionally adopted by the Drafting 
Committee on 28 and 29 May and on 1 and 2 June 2015, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.853, p. 3. 
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“The purpose of paragraph 4 is to indicate that the definition adopted for these 
draft articles has no effect upon broader definitions that may exist currently in 
other instruments, such as the 2006 International Convention for the Protection of 
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, or in national laws. It also makes clear 
that the present draft articles have no effect on the adoption, in the future, of a 
broader definition of crimes against humanity in an international instrument or a 
national law.”99 
The commentary on paragraph 4, provisionally adopted by the International 
Law Commission, notes the differences between the definition of enforced 
disappearance in article 7 of the Rome Statute and the formulation in other 
international instruments. ‘Those differences principally are that the latter 
instruments do not include the element “with the intention of removing them 
from the protection of the law,” do not include the words “for a prolonged period 
of time”, and do not refer to organizations as potential perpetrators of the crime 
when they act without State participation’, it declares.100 
The draft definition of crimes against humanity proposed by the Special 
Rapporteur of the International Law Commission and adopted provisionally 
mimics the terms of article 7 of the Rome Statute. None of the other international 
instruments purport to define crimes against humanity and all seem to 
acknowledge that the crime against humanity of enforced disappearance is a 
narrower subset of the broader notion of enforced disappearance. Nevertheless, 
the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances has implied its 
dissatisfaction with the text in the Rome Statute. Furthermore, speaking of the 
2006 Convention the Working Group has said that ‘[t]he travaux préparatoires 
confirm that States did not intend to give a “definition” of enforced 
disappearances as a crime against humanity, but mainly to recall that, in 
accordance with other instruments and sources of international law, this 
qualification was accepted’.101 Paragraph 4 of the International Law Commission 
draft, taken together with draft commentary, also seems to imply a degree of 
unease with the definition of crimes against humanity in the Rome Statute, and 
an impatience for its enlargement so that the two concepts, the crime of enforced 
disappearance and the crime against humanity of enforced disappearance, are 
brought closer together. These views are likely to resonate with judges at both 
the national and international level, who have been inclined to opt for expansive 
approaches to the interpretation of crimes against humanity. Warnings that such 
liberal approaches may discourage ratification of instruments like the Rome 
Statute, and hinder the adoption of a full-blown convention dealing with crimes 
against humanity, do not seem to have raised serious concerns. 
                                                                          
99 Crimes against humanity, Statement of the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, Mr. Mathias 
Forteau, 5 June 2015, p.  
100 Report of the International Law Commission, Sixty-seventh session (4 May-5 June and 6 July-7 
August 2015), UN Doc. A/70/10, para. 117(40). 
101 General comment on enforced disappearance as a crime against humanity, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/13/31, para. 39. 
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